Engineering expertise. Applied.

The challenge

HSE requirements had accumulated across a group of subsidiaries and joint ventures spanning upstream, downstream, marine and logistics. Standards overlapped, contradicted each other, and were interpreted differently from one company to the next.

What AVC did

• Reviewed 160+ existing HSE standards, guidelines and corporate practices against UAE law and international frameworks, including IOGP.
• Built one framework of 8 risk domains and 80+ Corporate Practices, each paired with an audit-ready assurance checklist.
• Rolled it out through 9 computer-based training modules and 11 train-the-trainer sessions on SAP Learning, working with 120+ ADNOC subject matter experts.

Value delivered

• 40%fewer redundant or obsolete HSE requirements after rationalisation
• 15,000+personnel trained on the new framework
• 1HSE framework across 32 group companies and five business lines.

The challenge

Fischer-Tropsch reactor coils were thinning and primary filters were repeatedly blocking. At the same time, ORYX GTL had to choose a turnaround strategy and test whether the plant could run beyond its 2032 design life to 2039.

What AVC did

• Root cause analyses of the FT reactor coil thinning and LTFT primary filter blocking.
• A RAM model of 1,600 equipment items, simulated over 24 years, testing 10 turnaround and failure scenarios.
• Bad-actor and black-swan analysis (2006–2021), a review of maintenance strategies across 30,000+ SAP equipment items, an organisational assessment and a remaining-life assessment to 2039.

Value delivered

• +1.7 ptsModelled production-efficiency improvement for three-yearly rather than two-yearly turnarounds: 83.5% to 85.2%. This is a study scenario.
• 2Coil damage mechanisms identified: internal flow-accelerated corrosion and external catalyst erosion. Filter failures were traced to manufacturing quality assurance.
• 2039Life-extension case assessed to 2039, supported by capital and operating expenditure forecasts across equipment disciplines.

The challenge

Inspection programmes had grown out of historical practice rather than damage mechanisms. Inspection effort was not reliably landing where corrosion actually occurs.

What AVC did

• Damage mechanism reviews, piping circuitisation and API 581 RBI in Meridium across SCP and JCP, including 17 JCP units approved in three batches.
• Registers covering 21,739 tagged items, 3,000+ piping circuits and 1,617 corrosive deadlegs marked up on 745 P&IDs.
• RBI evergreening of about 900 equipment items after turnaround, plus inspection isometrics and a workbook for each circuit.

Value delivered

• ~50%Of historical JCP inspection locations were found outside damage-susceptible zones: 2,860 of 5,777. A finding used to re-target inspection effort.
• 1 in 3JCP inspection locations used a technique unsuited to the damage mechanism. The study identified opportunities for more targeted inspection.
• 3 plantsRepeat awards across SCP, JCP and SPCo, extending from RBI into integrity and inspection management.

The challenge

Three Ras Laffan operators needed inspection programmes based on damage mechanisms, with complete piping-circuit and deadleg coverage, to support risk-based inspection.

What AVC did

• Damage mechanism review, piping circuitisation and Meridium API 581 RBI across 23 units at Q-Chem I, Q-Chem II and RLOC, with corrosive deadleg registers to API 570/574.
• DMR, corrosion loops and RBI for RLOC's NZLD project and the Furnace-6 project, certified by the client as completed to a satisfactory level.
• Now delivering RLPP's Fixed Equipment Monitoring Program: 1,359 P&IDs, 33,125 piping lines and 1,276 fixed equipment items.

Value delivered

• 23process units across Q-Chem I, Q-Chem II and RLOC moved onto a risk-based inspection basis
• 33,125Piping lines in the scope of RLPP’s ongoing risk-based fixed-equipment monitoring programme.
• 3Ras Laffan operators served through successive awards.

The challenge

A growing rig fleet needed current safety cases and hazard surveys, delivered rig by rig, to keep operations compliant and accepted.

What AVC did

• Rig safety cases, HAZOP and HAZID studies.
• Dropped-object (DROPS) surveys across the fleet, including a rig in Singapore.
• Noise surveys, each delivered against a tracked register with client acceptance letters.

Value delivered

• 18rig safety cases accepted by the client
• 73Dropped-object surveys accepted by the client, providing a documented basis for managing dropped-object hazards.
• 9Noise surveys accepted by the client.

The challenge

After the merger, the Asset Integrity Division's structure, staffing and competencies had to keep pace with a sharply rising integrity workload.

What AVC did

• Reviewed 220+ evidence items and interviewed 35 people, about 20% of the division.
• Benchmarked the organisation against global and regional practice.
• Delivered a manpower model, RACI, improvement roadmap and Management of Change pack.

Value delivered

• 2.4×Pipeline inspection workload quantified for 2024–2027: approximately 77 inspections a year compared with a historical 32.
• 4 → 32Growth in the division’s project portfolio made visible to support resourcing decisions.
• ExcellentClient feedback rating for the engagement.

The challenge

Solan's Maximo maintenance build had become inconsistent. Routines were duplicated, safety-critical flagging was uncertain, and there were gaps against the platform's performance standards.

What AVC did

• A maintenance and reliability strategy and roadmap covering 25 systems, with 1,615 instrument tags mapped.
• A line-of-sight review across 16,096 Maximo locations: from performance standards, through safety-critical flagging, to assurance routines.
• 153 actions on the performance standards and in Maximo, including 36 new assurance routines.

Value delivered

• 22% → 13%Review recommendation to revise safety-critical flagging from 2,955 to 1,806 tags, providing a clearer basis for assurance priorities.
• 232Duplicate maintenance routines identified for removal. This is a review finding.
• 6Assurance gaps identified across flame arrestors, pressure safety valves, Rig-Saver valves, ignition control, fire and gas, and cause-and-effect systems.

The challenge

FFC needed a clear assessment of asset integrity, maintenance and reliability to support a service-factor target above 97% at ageing ammonia and urea plants.

What AVC did

• An ISO 55001-aligned gap and maturity assessment across 13 departments.
• A review of the asset hierarchy against ISO 14224.
• A prioritised improvement roadmap and a three-day training programme.

Value delivered

• 128prioritised recommendations forming the improvement roadmap
• 13Departments covered by the ISO 55001-aligned gap and maturity assessment.
• 3 daysTraining delivered alongside the assessment and improvement roadmap.

The challenge

The ammonia plant had no consistent asset hierarchy or criticality method, so maintenance priorities could not be set on a common basis.

What AVC did

• A criticality assignment procedure and template, issued as a Ma'aden controlled document.
• An ISO 14224-aligned rebuild of the Ammonia 2 asset hierarchy.
• Criticality re-mapped to the new hierarchy, with a pilot of main-function assessment.

Value delivered

• 1company criticality procedure, giving one basis for setting maintenance priorities
• ISO 14224aligned asset hierarchy for Ammonia 2, with every asset's criticality re-mapped to it

The challenge

PC(T)SB needs its operations HSE cases and process safety information revalidated to current methods and data, across onshore gas processing and offshore hubs.

What AVC is delivering

• An operations HSE case revalidation for the gas treatment plant and onshore gas terminal, including expansion.
• A new QRA in PHAST/SAFETI 9.3 using OGP 2019 leak data, plus building risk assessment, fire and explosion risk assessment, hazardous area classification, bow-ties, ALARP and safety-critical elements.
• A second call-off for the MCR-A hub HSE case.

Ongoing scope and progress

• 4 yrsService agreement running from 2026 to 2030. Study delivery is in progress.
• 2Call-offs issued for onshore facilities and the MCR-A offshore hub.